Major IT outage affecting banks, airlines, media outlets across the world
abc.net.au
All our servers and company laptops went down at pretty much the same time. Laptops have been bootlooping to blue screen of death. It's all very exciting, personally, as someone not responsible for fixing it.
Apparently caused by a bad CrowdStrike update.
Edit: now being told we (who almost all generally work from home) need to come into the office Monday as they can only apply the fix in-person. We'll see if that changes over the weekend...
You are viewing a single comment
I see a lot of hate ITT on kernel-level EDRs, which I wouldn't say they deserve. Sure, for your own use, an AV is sufficient and you don't need an EDR, but they make a world of difference. I work in cybersecurity doing Red Teamings, so my job is mostly about bypassing such solutions and making malware/actions within the network that avoids being detected by it as much as possible, and ever since EDRs started getting popular, my job got several leagues harder.
The advantage of EDRs in comparison to AVs is that they can catch 0-days. AV will just look for signatures, a known pieces or snippets of malware code. EDR, on the other hand, looks for sequences of actions a process does, by scanning memory, logs and hooking syscalls. So, if for example you would make an entirely custom program that allocates memory as Read-Write-Execute, then load a crypto dll, unencrypt something into such memory, and then call a thread spawn syscall to spawn a thread on another process that runs it, and EDR would correlate such actions and get suspicious, while for regular AV, the code would probably look ok. Some EDRs even watch network packets and can catch suspicious communication, such as port scanning, large data extraction, or C2 communication.
Sure, in an ideal world, you would have users that never run malware, and network that is impenetrable. But you still get at avarage few % of people running random binaries that came from phishing attempts, or around 50% people that fall for vishing attacks in your company. Having an EDR increases your chances to avoid such attack almost exponentionally, and I would say that the advantage it gives to EDRs that they are kernel-level is well worth it.
I'm not defending CrowdStrike, they did mess up to the point where I bet that the amount of damages they caused worldwide is nowhere near the amount damages all cyberattacks they prevented would cause in total. But hating on kernel-level EDRs in general isn't warranted here.
Kernel-level anti-cheat, on the other hand, can go burn in hell, and I hope that something similar will eventually happen with one of them. Fuck kernel level anti-cheats.
The problem here isn't if you should run EDR or not it's that people need to take the risk and responsibilities seriously and the cure needs to to be better than the disease.
If you need to hand remote kernel level access over to a company it's in you to make sure they have the security, QA and basic competency to shoulder that responsibility.
And when it comes out that they don't even run or verify their code before deploying it to millions of machines all at once, it's on you for buying not vetting them.
Just like users should check files and where they come from before running them IT professionals need to do the same.