By the time an attacker has a write access to your boot permission everything else is kinda fucked already.
This is worse than many, since it persists across reinstalls and even potentially drive swaps, and fools systems such as secure boot.
If it's only on the ESP, it won't persist across reinstalls, and definitely not drive swaps.
But I do see mentions of attacking via firmware capsule. If that works, then yes, that will persist.
ESP is usually not cleared on a reinstall unless somebody takes the extra step to do so. Since each OS has its own directory within the ESP their installers don't push it. I was mostly referring to modification in firmware though.
Yes, an attacker with write access to boot already compromised the entire OS and data. Usually replacing the storage or reinstalling the OS would get rid of the attacker. But this exploit happens early in the boot process, before the OS even loads.
This means the only way to ensure a network remains uncompromised after an attack is physically destroying any infected devices or replacing their mainboard.
There are major benefits to this approach. One is that no executable code ever touches the hard drive, a technique known as fileless malware that hampers detection by antivirus and other types of endpoint protection software. Another benefit: Once the image is in place, it ensures a device remains infected even when an operating system is reinstalled or the main hard drive is replaced.
Because there really isn't one, lol.
By the time an attacker has a write access to your boot permission everything else is kinda fucked already.
This is worse than many, since it persists across reinstalls and even potentially drive swaps, and fools systems such as secure boot.
If it's only on the ESP, it won't persist across reinstalls, and definitely not drive swaps.
But I do see mentions of attacking via firmware capsule. If that works, then yes, that will persist.
ESP is usually not cleared on a reinstall unless somebody takes the extra step to do so. Since each OS has its own directory within the ESP their installers don't push it. I was mostly referring to modification in firmware though.
Yes, an attacker with write access to boot already compromised the entire OS and data. Usually replacing the storage or reinstalling the OS would get rid of the attacker. But this exploit happens early in the boot process, before the OS even loads.
This means the only way to ensure a network remains uncompromised after an attack is physically destroying any infected devices or replacing their mainboard.