NIST proposes barring some of the most nonsensical password rules
arstechnica.com
Here is the text of the NIST sp800-63b Digital Identity Guidelines.
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Here is the text of the NIST sp800-63b Digital Identity Guidelines.
Then you're vulnerable to simple brute force attacks, which if paired with a dumped hash table, can severely cut the time it takes to solve the hash and reveal all passwords.
By any length I meant no maximum length. Obviously you don't want to use a super short password.
"What's your password?"
"The letter A."
Mine is the null string. They'll never guess it!
Some kind of upper bound is usually sensible. You can open a potential DoS vector by accepting anything. The 72 byte bcrypt/scrypt limit is generally sensible, but going for 255 would be fine. There's very little security to be gained at those lengths.
I do 256 so I hopefully never need to update it, but most of my passwords are 20-30 characters or something, and generated by my password manager. I don't care if you choose to write a poem or enter a ton of unicode, I just need a bunch of bytes to hash.