Question: is systemd-homed ready for everyday use yet?

Prunebutt@feddit.de to Linux@lemmy.ml – 61 points –

Hi! I want to try out fedora workstation in the near future (once 39 is out) and was wondering if systemd-homed is ready for everyday use yet.

I'm a bit paranoid and really need my private data encrypted. However, I don't think that full disk encryption is practical for my daily use. Therefore I was really looking forward to the encryption possibilities of systemd-homed.

However, after reading up on it, I was a bit discouraged. AFAIK, there's no option to setup systemd-homed at installation (of fedora). I was an Arch then Manjaro, then Endeavour user for years but don't have the time/patience anymore to configure major parrts of my system anymore. Also, the documentation doesn't seem too noob-friendly to me, which also plays into the time/patience argument.

Is it ready? Can anyone seriously recommend it for a lazy ex-Arch user who doesn't want to break another linux installation?

Thank you in advance. :)

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Once that key is loaded in memory anyone with 10 minutes and access to google could trivially unlock your computer in several different ways. It is virtually exactly like having no security whatsoever.

I highly doubt it.

If you have any tips for how I can personally bypass my computer's encryption in 10 minutes without being able to login, I'd love to try my hand at it.

You aren't actually asking to how to bypass encryption because the key is already in memory. You are asking about the much simpler task of compromising a computer with physical access to same. Depending on configuration this can be as ridiculous as killing the lockscreen process or as hard as physically opening the case chilling the contents of ram enough that data survives transfer to different physical hardware. See also the massive attack surface of the USB stack.

That doesn't sound trivial at all.

On most systems you can press a hotkey in grub to edit the Linux command line that will be booted and in about 7 keystrokes gain access to any unlocked filesystem. Asking how you can break into a system you physically control is like asking how many ways you could break into a house supposing you had an hour alone with a crowbar the answers are legion. No machine in someone else's hand which is unlocked can possibly be deemed secure.

Even dumber no installer will create such an insecure configuration because the people that design Linux installers are smarter than you.

I'm not advocating for this right now, but yes that is why when using TPM password, one must insure to enable secure boot, enable bios password, disable boot media, and disable grub editing. That's the recommended proceedure for this setup.

This is essentially how HEADs works too. Some very smart people have worked on TPM boot and it is even built into systemd. You're just wrong here.

Reference:

Whether I would fully rely on the systems proper operation against a state sponsored adversary is a different question though.

Ah yes security brought to you by the same folks who brought you "bypass encryption by holding down the enter key" and "name your user 0day to get root access"

It's like putting security cams and interior locks all over your house instead of locking the front door. If your storage can't be read without the passphrase then NOTHING can fail in such a way as to provide access. Simplicity and obvious correctness have virtues.

There isn't much reason to use anything other than FDE with a sufficient passphrase, auto login so the user doesn't have to type two distinct passwords, and go luks suspends to evict key from memory on suspend.

Boot up enter the passphrase -> see your desktop -> close the lid -> open the lid -> enter your passphrase

I don't think you understand the TPM chain, there is absolutely value in validating that the firmware, bootloader, kernel, and initramfs haven't changed and not decrypt the disk if they have. That's what the TPM does, it doesn't just store a key, it calculates it.

Obviously, the optimal setup is TPM calculation + passphrase, which completely avoids decrypting the drive if some compromise, or modification, happened somewhere in the bootchain, or if the disk is taken out of the computer.

I never suggested there wasn't value in the TPM for anyone although I think such validation has small value for most folks use case. Normal users are worried about theft of laptop by criminals not spies bugging their machine. I suggested that any configuration without a passphrase was inherently insecure.

It's not an "optimal setup" its the only setup that makes even the slightest sense because the alternative configuration can be defeated by a smart 12 year old with access to google.

Though after a point rubber hose cryptanalysis will become the more pragmatic option for an attacker.

Depends on the attacker. For example: In Europe, law enforcement can legally confiscate/steal your laptop and read out the keys from RAM. They can't (legally) force you to give up your password.

I can say with full confidence this is something you'll never actually need to worry about. Law enforcement isn't just going to grab laptops and pull keys. Plus, it's easier for them to grab the laptop while it's logged in anyways. 😐

I know of several instances where laptops where confiscated and I wouldn't put it past law enforcement to know how to extract the keys.

Actually, thinking more about this...

Can you give an example of this grub cmdline bypass? If what you're saying is true, this would be a huge issue. I'd switch bootloaders over something like this.

You can google lets drop all the crap you think you understand but don't use simple logic. Unencrypted data isn't secure against physical access. If your data is automatically unencrypted without benefit of entering a passphrase then its not actually secure. There's no free lunch.

Lol, holy hostility, Batman.

I know there's no such thing as a free lunch. That's why I purchased a TPM for my machine. Anyway, if your intent is to prevent someone from sticking your HDD into another machine to extract your data, FDE ticks that box. If you're worried about highly advanced attacks to find your kiddie porn collection, then you probably are justified in your paranoia.

Security is about understanding reasonable threat models. 99.99% of reasonable threats to your machine involve theft or loss of the entire machine and personal data or accounts being accessed. This doesn't require advanced attacks or paranoia nor does it require extreme measures to protect against. No installer will create such a configuration without a passphrase because its a simple and effective step to take to protect your data that is enforced by systems created by people who are all smarter than you.

Your cute statement about child porn is tasteless and thoughtless. I don't take reasonable precautions like taking 5 seconds to type a password because I'm paranoid or criminal I do so because I have basic common sense.

"Arguing that you don't care about the right to privacy because you have nothing to hide is no different than saying you don't care about free speech because you have nothing to say." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nothing_to_hide_argument

Security is about understanding reasonable threat models. 99.99% of reasonable threats to your machine involve theft or loss of the entire machine and personal data or accounts being accessed..

A thief is going to steal your computer and gut it, not apply liquid nitrogen to your RAM and attach a bunch of instruments with hopes of extracting a crypto key so he can have a small chance at accessing potentially interesting data.

If you think a thief is going to do more, your threat model is very skewed. I suspect that you think you're much more interesting than you actually are.

Your cute statement about child porn is tasteless and thoughtless.

But it was cute.

You asked for details and pick on the unlikely measure of cold boot but ignore the fact that in most configurations you can press the letter "e" to edit the boot up command line. It wasn't "cute" it made you look like a gross human being.

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