You made an implicit assumption, and that assumption is very possibly wrong. You are "theorizing about the consequences" just as much as me by making that assumption.
For example, I can think of at least one way the US could've tried to avoid the huge civilian death toll: drop the bombs in the ocean, target the japanese navy, close enough that the blast will be seen from the mainland , yet far enough to avoid most civilian casualties. Then tell the Japanese to surrender, or else they're next. I don't claim to say it would've worked for sure, but at least they would've tried.
He's not theorizing, he's summarizing decades of historians' research. We know, for example, with the benefit of hindsight, that your idea would not have worked- it would have lead only to countless deaths via nuke, and then a long, slow slog through the meat grinder for troops and civilians.
How do we know this? Because we have Japanese communications from the time- and they basically sum up to something along the lines of "They don't have the balls to use the bomb against people again." with a side dash of "they don't have more bombs to throw at people."
Exploding the first one over water, the second one over a city on people, and then NOT dropping a third one because we didn't have anymore would have proved them right, and without a surrender it would have lead to millions of dead Americans and Japanese. They made so many purple hearts preparing for that invasion in 1945 that we still haven't gone through the backlog, 80 years later.
Now think about it without the benefit of hindsight. You know that culturally, they refuse to surrender. You know they see massive losses as completely acceptable, civilian, military, and suicide bombers. You know they want to try and grind the US down, make them give up because of the sheer number of troops dead. You know they're trying desperately to negotiate a favorable surrender where they can save face, maintain their 'experiments', and maintain their military, which is exactly the sort of thing that lead to WW2 in the first place. Finally you know you only have two bombs. Use them wrong, and the deaths, crippling, and wounding of millions of your own country's soldiers is directly on your head. Use them right, and you might get some surrenders.
Frankly speaking, dropping the two bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki almost didn't end the war. The second bomb was what finally changed the mind of the emperor, because he bought the bluff that if we had two we would throw at people, we had more. Even then, there was instantly a coup to try and halt the surrender process- and they thought this guy was literally an incarnation/speaker/appointed of god. That's how much the military hated the idea of surrendering.
And finally, do keep in mind- every time the US bombed a Japanese city, they dropped leaflets warning the civilians to get out. By all accounts, they were actually highly effective.
To make it clear, dropping the bombs was a horrible thing. That it killed so many civilians who wouldn't- or more likely couldn't - get out in time, even if warned, is horrific. Leaflets are good and all, but that doesn't meanyou have anywhere to go, or the infrastructure, and beyond that, the Emporer was executing anyone who tried to leave bombing areas. (Seriously, possession of a leaflet was grounds for immediate execution.) But the alternatives to dropping the bombs were judged, at the time, to be worse. And I believe that their decision to do so were understandable with the knowledge they had, the options they had, and the consequences to their own troops if they didn't.
Very well written comment that will no doubt be under appreciated lol
I appreciate well written comments. ysjet's response was detailed and well explained, and didn't just say "of course nothing else would've stopped them", but actually went in depth to explain why (which, of course, I don't fully agree with, but I'm here to discuss and hear other people's opinion).
Thank you for the very well written write up. It reflects my exact thoughts on the dropping of the bombs, but laid out in a much more coherent manner.
Dropping the bombs was by all means a horror unleashed to stop an even greater horror from occuring. A trolley problem incarnate almost. Personally I think trying to moralize the bombs at all is reductive and ignores many of the facts of the situation and creates an idealized version of how wars are/where conducted that simply is not real.
Thanks for the detailed response. Yes, I don't claim to say for sure that my idea would've worked, though you seem convinced it definitely wouldn't have, in hindsight. Yet, there are many other reports that point in the opposite direction, namely, that the Japanese were already beaten and likely to surrender anyways. I agree the culture was always to never surrender, so I doubt it, but the idea of being instantly destroyed after seeing the a-bomb in action could've changed somebody's mind.
And if that didn't work, maybe there was a way to avoid targeting civilians, while still hitting military targets, but it seems to me the intention was to hit civilians in large number, and that's what I don't like (and no, leaflets aren't really enough).
Also, I didn't know the US only had two bombs, so I did a bit of research, and actually, it seems a third one was gonna be ready pretty soon after. But then again, I'm glad a third one wasn't used...
You're welcome for the details.
So I see 'they were ready to surrender' a lot in this thread, and while that's not... false, it's not exactly what it sounds like. They were ready to come to the table, yes, absolutely, but the problem was that they wanted to dictate their surrender - they wanted to keep their military, they wanted their industry rebuilt, they wanted the current government to stay in power- it was less of a surrender or more of a cessation of hostilities. Japan was 'ready to surrender' in much the same way Russia was 'ready to come to the peace table' about a year ago.
This was geopolitically not realistic, for a number of reasons- for one, allowing that kind of conditional surrender with Germany is directly what lead to WW2 in the first place, and nobody had any intentions of repeating that mistake. There was concern, given the view on surrendering, that it wouldn't actually be peace, or a surrender, merely a delaying tactic to build up forces and entrench. For another, Russia was bearing down on Japan, and the Allies wanted to limit Russia's geopolitical influence by preventing another East/West Germany. While the extra troops would have undoubtedly help save American lives, it would have ended in significant Russian and Japanese deaths, as well significant geopolitical issues long-term (East/West Germany worked so well, after all :P )
Long story short, the Allies absolutely wanted an unconditional surrender, exactly the kind of thing the Emperor and the military refused to contemplate, even after a single bomb was dropped. The military still refused to consider it even after the second, so seeing the a-bomb in action once would likely, I feel, not have done much.
RE: hitting civilians in large numbers, my understanding is less that they were deliberately targeting civilians, and more that they were looking for military targets that were geographically located in a position that would enhance the bomb's effects without considering civilians too much. You could argue in a very real way that they were deployed as terror weapons, or perhaps 'shock and awe' weapons if you want to be slightly less confrontational. Civilian casualties were, much like the entire rest of WW2, not much of a consideration- WW2 was considered a total war, and the Geneva Convention would not be signed for another 4 years, directly as a result of the atrocities of WW2. At the time, civilians were not considered something to inherently avoid unless you had some sort of political reason to do so (hence the leaflets). The most obvious example of this is the firebombings of Tokyo, which killed far, far more civilians in arguably far more painful ways, but there's plenty of example in the European front from all sides as well. Again, they were making decisions with the knowledge and viewpoints of the time. Doesn't excuse it, but trying to moralize decisions made in the past with current morals is always kind of a waste of time, in my opinion.
Regarding the third shot, there was, at the time, no bombs available when the uranium Little Boy bomb for Hiroshima was dropped, but they had prepped for another. They immediately turned towards trying to prepare another (Nagasaki's plutonium-based Fat Man), and managed to rush it to completion in just a week, but keep in mind that these were highly dangerous, experimental one-off prototypes being produced- it's why all of the planned subsequent bombs were of the fat man design, which was significantly safer, and America was completely out of uranium at that. It was only able to be rushed to completion so much because General Groves always planned to use two, and a lot of the logistics were already worked out and prepped beforehand. Before more plutonium bombs could be made, Woodrow Wilson called off the production. So yes, America was technically out of bombs, and completely out of uranium.
Arguably, America could have created more plutonium bombs, but was limited by the availability of plutonium (which is lengthy to turn into weapons grade), the speed at which they could be safely produced (and Fat Man was, frankly, very unsafely produced, it should have taken nearly 3 weeks to create), and America only had a small amount of weapons-grade plutonium stockpiled. So technically, both positions are correct- America only had two bombs, and they certainly could have made more, but they were limited by time and materials, and lack of willingness. They had, perhaps, one or two more fat mans they would be able to drop, with perhaps 3+ week production times for each (because no logistics were prepared for it), before it would have dropped to something like iirc 6 months per bomb due to lack of prepared plutonium.
So yes, one could argue there could have been more bombs after the first two, but it was generally considered by the American military and also the President that two was the 'magic number,' so there wasn't any setup for them, so they would not have been cranked out anywhere near as fast. Nobody believed that one bomb would trigger a surrender (because of, again, the cultural viewpoints on surrendering) as well the implicit belief that it would be a one-off prototype that could not be repeated.
If two did not, and it was widely considered it would, nobody believed 3 would be any more likely to trigger a surrender than two did, and might even convince them to fight harder. In addition, due to the effects of radiation, America would have limited to how they could use the bombs one the land invasion started- with Russia from the north, America from the south-east, and most of central Japan firebombed, there's not a lot of good targets without hitting allies.
I don't even know how to continue this conversation. I didn't have to assume anything about Imperial Japan's reception to alternative methods of prompted surrender to arrive at the conclusion that the theoretical devastation of Fascism proliferating is at all comparable to the nuclear bombs that were deployed.
So, are you a stoned emo man, or a stone demoman, or what?
You've solved my secret username puzzle.
Also, yes.
You're right, this conversation is pointless. You keep making unproven assumptions, even in your last reply, and don't even know you're doing it. Maybe search "assumption" in the dictionary? Anyways, good luck.
? Choose your battles more carefully.
drop the bombs in the ocean, target the japanese navy, close enough that the blast will be seen from the mainland , yet far enough to avoid most civilian casualties. Then tell the Japanese to surrender, or else they’re next
The Trinity tests would have most likely been observed by Japanese spies/network, so the Japanese leadership already knew of the destructive nature of the bomb. And yet they didn't surrender when ordered, until the bomb was finally used on their citizenry.
The trinity tests weren't even close to Japan's shore... yes, spies would've seen it, or heard about it, but regular army people, generals, etc. and the emperor would only know a second or third hand story.
Compare that to walking down the street and seeing a giant mushroom cloud at a safe but not so far distance, potentially with a large part of Japan's navy gone in a blink (and maybe a bit of a tsunami as well). Let's say this was timed such that the emperor himself would likely observe it. We can't know for sure, and I concede that Japanese culture was very much "victory or death" at that time, but seeing it in person might, just might've changed some people's mind, with a much smaller civilian death toll.
Doesn't matter what the population thinks ultimately, it only matters what the leadership thinks, and the leadership would have gotten a full report on the destructive nature, and the ramifications of, from the Trinity test.
So blowing up another one off on the Tokyo Harbor wouldn't have added anything to what the leadership already knew about their chances of winning the war.
Trust me, if the leadership saw this first hand it would make a much bigger impression.
Anyways, I think the conversation derailed a bit, I cannot claim this would've worked for sure, I don't have a time machine.
My point is, this was done with the intention to cause mass civilian casualties, which today one could argue it being a war crime (and that's why I don't approve of it), but of course, the Geneva convention didn't exist yet at the time.
Maybe there was a different way to get the Japanese to surrender, with fewer casualties, but it doesn't look like the US really tried.
You made an implicit assumption, and that assumption is very possibly wrong. You are "theorizing about the consequences" just as much as me by making that assumption.
For example, I can think of at least one way the US could've tried to avoid the huge civilian death toll: drop the bombs in the ocean, target the japanese navy, close enough that the blast will be seen from the mainland , yet far enough to avoid most civilian casualties. Then tell the Japanese to surrender, or else they're next. I don't claim to say it would've worked for sure, but at least they would've tried.
He's not theorizing, he's summarizing decades of historians' research. We know, for example, with the benefit of hindsight, that your idea would not have worked- it would have lead only to countless deaths via nuke, and then a long, slow slog through the meat grinder for troops and civilians.
How do we know this? Because we have Japanese communications from the time- and they basically sum up to something along the lines of "They don't have the balls to use the bomb against people again." with a side dash of "they don't have more bombs to throw at people."
Exploding the first one over water, the second one over a city on people, and then NOT dropping a third one because we didn't have anymore would have proved them right, and without a surrender it would have lead to millions of dead Americans and Japanese. They made so many purple hearts preparing for that invasion in 1945 that we still haven't gone through the backlog, 80 years later.
Now think about it without the benefit of hindsight. You know that culturally, they refuse to surrender. You know they see massive losses as completely acceptable, civilian, military, and suicide bombers. You know they want to try and grind the US down, make them give up because of the sheer number of troops dead. You know they're trying desperately to negotiate a favorable surrender where they can save face, maintain their 'experiments', and maintain their military, which is exactly the sort of thing that lead to WW2 in the first place. Finally you know you only have two bombs. Use them wrong, and the deaths, crippling, and wounding of millions of your own country's soldiers is directly on your head. Use them right, and you might get some surrenders.
Frankly speaking, dropping the two bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki almost didn't end the war. The second bomb was what finally changed the mind of the emperor, because he bought the bluff that if we had two we would throw at people, we had more. Even then, there was instantly a coup to try and halt the surrender process- and they thought this guy was literally an incarnation/speaker/appointed of god. That's how much the military hated the idea of surrendering.
And finally, do keep in mind- every time the US bombed a Japanese city, they dropped leaflets warning the civilians to get out. By all accounts, they were actually highly effective.
To make it clear, dropping the bombs was a horrible thing. That it killed so many civilians who wouldn't- or more likely couldn't - get out in time, even if warned, is horrific. Leaflets are good and all, but that doesn't meanyou have anywhere to go, or the infrastructure, and beyond that, the Emporer was executing anyone who tried to leave bombing areas. (Seriously, possession of a leaflet was grounds for immediate execution.) But the alternatives to dropping the bombs were judged, at the time, to be worse. And I believe that their decision to do so were understandable with the knowledge they had, the options they had, and the consequences to their own troops if they didn't.
Very well written comment that will no doubt be under appreciated lol
I appreciate well written comments. ysjet's response was detailed and well explained, and didn't just say "of course nothing else would've stopped them", but actually went in depth to explain why (which, of course, I don't fully agree with, but I'm here to discuss and hear other people's opinion).
Thank you for the very well written write up. It reflects my exact thoughts on the dropping of the bombs, but laid out in a much more coherent manner.
Dropping the bombs was by all means a horror unleashed to stop an even greater horror from occuring. A trolley problem incarnate almost. Personally I think trying to moralize the bombs at all is reductive and ignores many of the facts of the situation and creates an idealized version of how wars are/where conducted that simply is not real.
Thanks for the detailed response. Yes, I don't claim to say for sure that my idea would've worked, though you seem convinced it definitely wouldn't have, in hindsight. Yet, there are many other reports that point in the opposite direction, namely, that the Japanese were already beaten and likely to surrender anyways. I agree the culture was always to never surrender, so I doubt it, but the idea of being instantly destroyed after seeing the a-bomb in action could've changed somebody's mind.
And if that didn't work, maybe there was a way to avoid targeting civilians, while still hitting military targets, but it seems to me the intention was to hit civilians in large number, and that's what I don't like (and no, leaflets aren't really enough).
Also, I didn't know the US only had two bombs, so I did a bit of research, and actually, it seems a third one was gonna be ready pretty soon after. But then again, I'm glad a third one wasn't used...
You're welcome for the details.
So I see 'they were ready to surrender' a lot in this thread, and while that's not... false, it's not exactly what it sounds like. They were ready to come to the table, yes, absolutely, but the problem was that they wanted to dictate their surrender - they wanted to keep their military, they wanted their industry rebuilt, they wanted the current government to stay in power- it was less of a surrender or more of a cessation of hostilities. Japan was 'ready to surrender' in much the same way Russia was 'ready to come to the peace table' about a year ago.
This was geopolitically not realistic, for a number of reasons- for one, allowing that kind of conditional surrender with Germany is directly what lead to WW2 in the first place, and nobody had any intentions of repeating that mistake. There was concern, given the view on surrendering, that it wouldn't actually be peace, or a surrender, merely a delaying tactic to build up forces and entrench. For another, Russia was bearing down on Japan, and the Allies wanted to limit Russia's geopolitical influence by preventing another East/West Germany. While the extra troops would have undoubtedly help save American lives, it would have ended in significant Russian and Japanese deaths, as well significant geopolitical issues long-term (East/West Germany worked so well, after all :P )
Long story short, the Allies absolutely wanted an unconditional surrender, exactly the kind of thing the Emperor and the military refused to contemplate, even after a single bomb was dropped. The military still refused to consider it even after the second, so seeing the a-bomb in action once would likely, I feel, not have done much.
RE: hitting civilians in large numbers, my understanding is less that they were deliberately targeting civilians, and more that they were looking for military targets that were geographically located in a position that would enhance the bomb's effects without considering civilians too much. You could argue in a very real way that they were deployed as terror weapons, or perhaps 'shock and awe' weapons if you want to be slightly less confrontational. Civilian casualties were, much like the entire rest of WW2, not much of a consideration- WW2 was considered a total war, and the Geneva Convention would not be signed for another 4 years, directly as a result of the atrocities of WW2. At the time, civilians were not considered something to inherently avoid unless you had some sort of political reason to do so (hence the leaflets). The most obvious example of this is the firebombings of Tokyo, which killed far, far more civilians in arguably far more painful ways, but there's plenty of example in the European front from all sides as well. Again, they were making decisions with the knowledge and viewpoints of the time. Doesn't excuse it, but trying to moralize decisions made in the past with current morals is always kind of a waste of time, in my opinion.
Regarding the third shot, there was, at the time, no bombs available when the uranium Little Boy bomb for Hiroshima was dropped, but they had prepped for another. They immediately turned towards trying to prepare another (Nagasaki's plutonium-based Fat Man), and managed to rush it to completion in just a week, but keep in mind that these were highly dangerous, experimental one-off prototypes being produced- it's why all of the planned subsequent bombs were of the fat man design, which was significantly safer, and America was completely out of uranium at that. It was only able to be rushed to completion so much because General Groves always planned to use two, and a lot of the logistics were already worked out and prepped beforehand. Before more plutonium bombs could be made, Woodrow Wilson called off the production. So yes, America was technically out of bombs, and completely out of uranium.
Arguably, America could have created more plutonium bombs, but was limited by the availability of plutonium (which is lengthy to turn into weapons grade), the speed at which they could be safely produced (and Fat Man was, frankly, very unsafely produced, it should have taken nearly 3 weeks to create), and America only had a small amount of weapons-grade plutonium stockpiled. So technically, both positions are correct- America only had two bombs, and they certainly could have made more, but they were limited by time and materials, and lack of willingness. They had, perhaps, one or two more fat mans they would be able to drop, with perhaps 3+ week production times for each (because no logistics were prepared for it), before it would have dropped to something like iirc 6 months per bomb due to lack of prepared plutonium.
So yes, one could argue there could have been more bombs after the first two, but it was generally considered by the American military and also the President that two was the 'magic number,' so there wasn't any setup for them, so they would not have been cranked out anywhere near as fast. Nobody believed that one bomb would trigger a surrender (because of, again, the cultural viewpoints on surrendering) as well the implicit belief that it would be a one-off prototype that could not be repeated.
If two did not, and it was widely considered it would, nobody believed 3 would be any more likely to trigger a surrender than two did, and might even convince them to fight harder. In addition, due to the effects of radiation, America would have limited to how they could use the bombs one the land invasion started- with Russia from the north, America from the south-east, and most of central Japan firebombed, there's not a lot of good targets without hitting allies.
I don't even know how to continue this conversation. I didn't have to assume anything about Imperial Japan's reception to alternative methods of prompted surrender to arrive at the conclusion that the theoretical devastation of Fascism proliferating is at all comparable to the nuclear bombs that were deployed.
So, are you a stoned emo man, or a stone demoman, or what?
You've solved my secret username puzzle.
Also, yes.
You're right, this conversation is pointless. You keep making unproven assumptions, even in your last reply, and don't even know you're doing it. Maybe search "assumption" in the dictionary? Anyways, good luck.
? Choose your battles more carefully.
The Trinity tests would have most likely been observed by Japanese spies/network, so the Japanese leadership already knew of the destructive nature of the bomb. And yet they didn't surrender when ordered, until the bomb was finally used on their citizenry.
The trinity tests weren't even close to Japan's shore... yes, spies would've seen it, or heard about it, but regular army people, generals, etc. and the emperor would only know a second or third hand story.
Compare that to walking down the street and seeing a giant mushroom cloud at a safe but not so far distance, potentially with a large part of Japan's navy gone in a blink (and maybe a bit of a tsunami as well). Let's say this was timed such that the emperor himself would likely observe it. We can't know for sure, and I concede that Japanese culture was very much "victory or death" at that time, but seeing it in person might, just might've changed some people's mind, with a much smaller civilian death toll.
Doesn't matter what the population thinks ultimately, it only matters what the leadership thinks, and the leadership would have gotten a full report on the destructive nature, and the ramifications of, from the Trinity test.
So blowing up another one off on the Tokyo Harbor wouldn't have added anything to what the leadership already knew about their chances of winning the war.
Trust me, if the leadership saw this first hand it would make a much bigger impression.
Anyways, I think the conversation derailed a bit, I cannot claim this would've worked for sure, I don't have a time machine. My point is, this was done with the intention to cause mass civilian casualties, which today one could argue it being a war crime (and that's why I don't approve of it), but of course, the Geneva convention didn't exist yet at the time.
Maybe there was a different way to get the Japanese to surrender, with fewer casualties, but it doesn't look like the US really tried.